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Organizing 
for Justice 
ILGWU returns to social unionism 
to organize immigrant workers 
• Jeff Hermanson 
• In El Paso, an apparel subcontractor padlocks his factory, then 
moves down the street to reopen under a new name. Led by the 
community organization La Mujer Obrera, the Latina garment 
workers from the original shop, owed six weeks' back wages, 
occupy the new factory and chain themselves to sewing machines. 
The cops cut the chains and haul the workers off to jail, where 
they continue their protest by refusing to eat. After their release, 
the workers take their struggle to New York's fashion center, and 
in alliance with the ILGWU, confront the owner of Jou Jou Designs 
(the company whose clothes they had sewed for free). Embar-
rassed and fearful of negative publicity, Jou Jou's owner flies to 
El Paso and directly pays the workers their back-wages, bypass-
ing the subcontractor who tried to cheat them. 
• After six years of bitter struggle, Latino workers at New York's 
largest sweater factory finally win an ILGWU contract. The fac-
tory's owner, in financial difficulty and desperate for skilled 
workers, turns to his former enemy, the ILGWU, for assistance. 
The Union, through its "Campaign for Justice," recruits Chinese 
nonunion operators from the Workers' Center's ESL and workers' 
rights classes, and secures funds for a labor-management training 
• Jeff Hermanson is Director of Organizing for the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers Union {ILGWU}. 
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program. Productivity and piece-rate earnings increase, as does 
in-shop militancy, when the workers demonstrate that the com-
bination of efficient labor and a union contract is a force to be 
reckoned with. 
• A San Francisco nonunion sweatshop owner borrows money 
from her own workers, then disappears, leaving 450 workers 
unemployed and owed more than a half-million dollars in back 
wages and loans. Tears streaming down their faces, the desperate 
workers seek help from the ILGWU's newly-opened Workers' 
Center in Chinatown. The Union, in alliance with community and 
political supporters, pressures the jobbers: two of the jobbers, The 
Gap and Byer of California, come up with $450,000. With the 
ILG's assistance, a new shop is set up to employ some of the 
displaced workers. 
Desperate situations bring forth desperate responses. But gar-
ment workers are demonstrating that when educated of their 
rights and assured of support, they are ready to struggle for justice, 
even when chances of success seem poor. The ILGWU currently 
faces many challenges: How do we organize an industry compos-
ed of thousands of tiny, subcontractors? How do we build on 
isolated collective actions to create a groundswell for change in 
the workers' communities that cannot be ignored? How do we 
restrict the flight of jobs from unionized communities to nonunion 
areas, within the U.S. and beyond its borders? 
The ILGWU's Campaign for Justice puts forth a controversial 
thesis: the conditions exist or can be created for the rapid organi-
zation of thousands of garment workers at a time. A community-
based strategy, properly implemented, can bring about an upsurge 
such as the ILGWU experienced in its early years. Through such 
a strategy, the Union can regain its position as a power in the gar-
ment industry, and begin to restrict the flight of jobs and deteriora-
tion of standards. 
Broad-based, mass organizing is our Union's legacy The ILGWU 
was built in the early 1900's, not by organizing one shop at a time, 
but by industry-wide, community-supported strikes. Anarchist, 
communist, and socialist agitators within the immigrant commu-
nity acted as a catalyst, stirring their fellow workers to unite to 
improve their horrible working conditions. The great strike of 
1909, the "Uprising of the 20,000", was led by young, newly 
immigrant women who the owners were sure would never strike. 
But these young women struck with a vengeance, and through 
their struggle they built the ILGWU, winning by waging economic 
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Shirtwaist workers on strike march to City Hall in 1909. 
warfare and battling for public awareness of their exploitation. 
They found allies outside their close-knit community, including 
the native-born, mostly middle-class women of the Women's Trade 
Union League, the Socialist Party, students at Vassar and Wellesley, 
progressive journalists and other reformers. This coalition pro-
vided support for the struggle which formed the ILGWU, not as 
a business union nor as a "trade union, pure and simple", but as 
a mass movement to fight widespread industry oppression and 
to remake society in a broad-based struggle for justice. The 
ILGWU calls this "social unionism." 
Our founders did not organize one shop at a time: they orga-
nized hundreds of shops at once. The garment industry manufac-
turers of the early 1900's not only maintained inside shops, but 
also sent out large amounts of work to homeworkers and subcon-
tractors. In order to effectively cripple production, the union had 
to unify the workers in all segments of the industry. Again in the 
1930's, whole industry sectors were organized overnight as the 
workers rebelled en masse against the Depression-era sweatshops. 
Throughout most of the ILGWU's history, our organizing 
strategy—by choice and necessity—has been the general strike. 
BUILDING A CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE 
As in the past, the dazzling wealth of Seventh Avenue is created 
in dingy sweatshops in poor immigrant communities. The power 
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of the millionaire designers arises from thousands of tiny subcon-
tracting shops, employing an average of less than 30 workers each. 
To successfully wage battle against this wealth and power, gar-
ment workers must unite their own ranks and seek support from 
the wider community, as in 1909. We must return to the social 
unionism of our founders: organizing thousands of workers at a 
time, becoming the voice of the all garment workers, and mobiliz-
ing our allies outside the labor community in order to increase 
our influence and leverage. Once again, conditions exist which 
suggest the strategy of the general strike. 
The ILGWU's Campaign for Justice strategy first identifies con-
centrated employment and living areas of garment workers. We 
aim to develop the existing conditions that are favorable to organiz-
ing and then initiate struggles. Within the community, the tactics 
will vary and are dictated to some extent by each community's 
particular circumstances and conditions. We have developed the 
following five principles: 
First, the Campaign for Justice must be community-based. We 
create links to the community of workers through meeting their 
immediate needs and concerns, including those which go beyond 
the shop floor. We establish a physical location, a worker's center, 
in the midst of our battleground so that everyone can find it. We 
build alliances by reaching out to existing religious, community, 
and political organizations that are trusted and supported by the 
workers. In the past five years the ILGWU has established five 
workers' centers: Brooklyn, El Paso, San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
and Manhattan. 
Second, after recruiting enough members to establish a base, 
an elected "workers' council" guides the center's activities. 
Subcommittees on membership, education, political action, 
services and social and sports activities are formed. One of the 
lessons we've learned is to avoid pushing to form factory-based 
committees. Many times it's impossible to get a broad committee 
going in any one factory, but we can get three or four people from 
that factory to a bigger, community-based committee. From that 
larger committee we can maintain contact with particular factories 
and work to recruit more members. 
Third, the workers' center provides concrete services to garment 
workers and their families that immediately improve conditions. 
We offer classes in English, Spanish literacy, and skills training. 
There is immigration counseling and discussions about workers' 
rights. We organize social and sports activities, leadership train-
ing and newsletters, and provide economic services, such as food 
buying co-ops, store discounts, and job referrals. 
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In all our activities and services, we utilize a participatory, ' 'con-
sciousness-raising" approach, and seek to develop the workers' 
leadership abilities. For example, English classes are used to 
encourage workers to articulate their feelings about, and develop 
their understanding of, their position in the society and the system 
of production, the concepts of unity and struggle, and the legal 
and political system. 
Fourth, once workers begin to develop a basic understanding 
of their common oppression, and wish to take action to improve 
their living and working conditions, struggles are initiated. These 
are not contract struggles: in one instance, a boss was an out-
rageous sexual harasser; in order to protect the identities of the 
inside workers, workers' center members leafletted. We have also 
leafletted to protest unheated shops, locked fire exits and other 
unsafe working conditions. One day work stoppages have also 
been effective. We've organized mass demonstrations and boycotts 
at grocery stores that were dirty and didn't post prices on each 
item. We look for victories that resolve the immediate problem 
and show the workers their own potential power, without risk-
ing everything. 
Finally, we try to use each localized struggle to sensitize the 
broader community to the conditions that exist. We develop a mass 
media strategy which emphasizes the human rights and social 
justice issues. We couldn't afford to pay for the kind of free press 
coverage that we've received in El Paso, with front page stories 
almost every day for months. We try to present a clear issue in 
compelling form and then mobilize prominent local, regional and 
national groups to actively and publicly support us. Hunger strikes 
and factory occupations give our struggles a dramatic face; people 
see the pictures and begin to understand. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN BROOKLYN & EL PASO 
We are still at the initial stages of testing our Campaign for 
Justice strategy. The Brooklyn workers' center, located on the 
border between Williamsburg and Bushwick in a largely Mexican, 
Dominican and Haitian community is in a "working poor" neigh-
borhood that contains over a hundred knitwear and sportswear 
factories. Most of these shops belong to the Williamsburg Trade 
Association (WTA), an employers' organization that has a sweet-
heart agreement with an independent union of their own crea-
tion, the "United Production Workers, Local 17-18." Five thousand 
garment workers have been exploited by this unholy alliance, and 
for the past 15 years these workers have been coming to the 
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ILGWU and asking, "Isn't there something we can do?" 
Since the NLRB presumes this multi-employer association to be 
a single, appropriate unit for collective bargaining, we were faced 
with organizing 5,000 workers in over 125 shops. We began by 
targeting workers at the 35 largest plants in the Association. In 
six months we signed up over 2500 workers, and in January 1989 
filed over 30 separate petitions, as well as a petition for an 
association-wide election. 
In the years that followed as the NLRB considered which peti-
tion^) to accept, we realized that the factory-based organizing 
committees we had set up were not adequate to maintain the 
workers spirit over the long haul. To build and sustain the move-
ment, we needed to bring the workers from many factories 
together. This led us to form the first workers' center in Williams-
burg in late 1990. 
We found that workers were eager to join our workers' center. 
In a short time, we recruited hundreds of workers willing to parti-
cipate and to pay annual dues of $12.00 to become associate 
members of the ILGWU. We also formed an area pastor's council 
of eight ministers and priests who wanted to work with us. The 
ILGWU's Immigration Project helped undocumented workers get 
their green cards through the amnesty program, and at the 
workers' center we taught basic English, Spanish literacy, and GED 
programs. 
ILG Vice President Edgar Romney discusses contract negotiations at 
the Williamsburg Worker's Center with newly organized workers from 
Mademoiselle. 
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Our most significant victory to date came when the WTA's 
largest shop, Mademoiselle Knitwear, a sweater factory of over 
500 workers, decided to drop out of the Association and fight us 
on their own. The employer, who had been a founder and long 
time president of the Association, was sure he could defeat us in 
an NLRB election. The subsequent election was indeterminate, 
and while the challenged ballots lay uncounted, the ILGWU built 
pressure. The presence of the workers' center, and the activities 
in both the factory and the neighborhood, caused Mademoiselle 
to realize that not only were we not going to quit, but that we 
were getting stronger. The battle waged by the workers on the 
shop floor and the high turnover of dissatisfied workers continu-
ally disrupted production, and distracted the employer from his 
business. In the meantime, several sets of unfair labor practice 
charges ate up hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees. 
Finally, over a year after the election, tired of fighting and forced 
into Chapter 11, the employer buckled and came to the Union 
to make peace. 
Our victory at Mademoiselle Knitwear gave a tremendous boost 
to the workers' center staff and membership, and we continue 
to build toward a final struggle with the rest of the Williamsburg 
Trade Association. An NLRB election in the remaining WTA shops, 
employing about 3000 workers, is expected in early 1993. 
Taking on the subcontractors in El Paso 
We have replicated the Campaign for Justice strategy in other 
major garment centers. In El Paso we are organizing in com-
munities on both sides of the United States/Mexico border, since 
many of the garment workers live in Ciudad Juarez, and commute 
daily across the border into El Paso. This is a virulently anti-union 
environment—it's still against Texas law for a non-citizen to be 
a labor organizer. 
In the 1970s, El Paso was the site of the ACTWU's epic four 
year strike against Farah. A tremendous effort by the Farah 
workers and ACTWU resulted in an historic victory and a union 
contract for thousands of workers. But in the '80s, Farah, along 
with many other employers, moved their operation to Mexico, and 
thousands of El Paso garment workers lost their jobs or were 
forced into the tiny sweatshops that remained. 
Due to our alliance with a community organization called La 
Mujer Obrera ("Working Women") we were able to move quickly 
into action. La Mujer Obrera had an already established center, 
El Centro Obrero ("Workers' Center") and a membership organiza-
tion of the type that we are now establishing elsewhere. They 
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agreed to set up a joint garment workers' center with the ILGWU 
and we began to work together to carry out the struggle. Although 
we ultimately were unable to maintain our alliance with La Mujer 
Obrera, we learned a great deal from our work with them. 
Energized by the Jou Jou Design victory described earlier, we 
took on a union organizing campaign. We struck DCB Apparel 
Group, a Los Angeles firm that produces their garments in El Paso. 
They had four contractors in El Paso with a total of about 150 
workers. DCB Apparel's contractors were also guilty of non-
payment of wages, with one shop, Sonia Fashion, owing their 
minimum-wage workers $85,000. We began the strike there, then 
extended it to the other shops. 
Seventy-five workers occupied Sonia Fashion for three months, 
and a dozen workers engaged in a hunger strike that lasted for 
23 days. Community support and extensive local publicity 
prevented the employer and building owner from challenging the 
occupation. Upon leaving the building, the workers seized the sew-
ing machines in lieu of their back wages, and placed them under 
lock and key for the duration of the strike. We chased DCB's 
production into Mexico, and pressured their customers from New 
York City to Los Angeles. The struggle got national press atten-
tion. The Texas Attorney General used a new interpretation of 
Texas law to hold the jobber, DCB, responsible for the wages owed 
by its subcontractors. 
After eight months we won the strike and achieved a "jobber's 
agreement" from DCB that guarantees employment for 125 
workers in their shops, health insurance, and other benefits and 
increases wages. We won a ground-breaking restriction on the 
company's right to source production abroad. We met incredible 
resistance by other area employers, who collaborated with DCB 
and donated resources to try to beat us. But our broader coali-
tion, militant tactics, and most of all the determination of the 
workers won in the end. 
BUILDING FOR THE DECADES TO COME 
We haven't organized large numbers through our Campaign for 
Justice workers' centers yet, and they are far from self-sustaining. 
But we have positioned the ILGWU as a leader in the struggle, 
both in the workers' communities and in the broader public arena. 
We are building for the decades to come, not just for any particular 
campaign. Such long-term thinking requires a substantial risk and 
the commitment of substantial resources by the ILGWU, literally 
millions of dollars. 
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Since we can already 
mobilize hundreds of workers 
in struggle in each area, we 
can reasonably expect to 
mobilize thousands in the near 
future. Given time, we will 
revitalize our union and 
recover the strength and mili-
tancy of our early years. 
We have already learned 
many important lessons. First, 
it's possible to develop a rank 
and file leadership experi-
enced in organization and 
militant methods of struggle 
through the workers' council 
approach. Secondly, a commu-
nity-based organizational structure can both anchor and sustain 
factory and strike committees over a long term. Finally, it is not 
easy to build lasting alliances with community organizations, 
especially under the pressure of lengthy and difficult struggles. 
This approach may generate mass strikes on the scale of the 
1930's if conditions are right and we choose to do so. But if it 
simply provides a broad base of support for factory-based cam-
paigns, such as the Mademoiselle Knitwear and DCB Apparel 
Group campaigns, and enables us to take on bigger, more com-
plicated multi-plant campaigns, then this approach will have 
proved successful. 
The impact on the political environment and on public con-
sciousness may be the most important short-term effect of highly 
visible community-based union organizing. We must make the 
broader public become aware of, and take responsibility for chang-
ing the miserable, unjust living and working conditions that exist 
within our borders. The reality remains that in 1993, children in 
the U.S. suffer in sweatshops and garment workers are often not 
paid for their labor. 
For the long term, the key to the labor movement's survival is 
its self-transformation. Unions must take responsibility for effec-
tively addressing the issues that deeply affect the working class 
beyond their own ranks. If we in the labor movement are com-
mitted to organizing the unorganized, we must first learn to serve 
their needs, win their trust, and engage them in struggle. If we 
do so, the labor movement can once again aspire to lead a broad, 
mass movement for social justice. • 
